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Abstract: What is the effect of providing personally tailored 
budgetary information on public attitudes to tax and spending? We 
address this question with a survey experiment based on the annual 
tax summaries introduced by the UK tax authorities in 2014. By 
subtly manipulating the categories of state spending Ð in particular, 
the controversial category of ÒwelfareÓ Ð to invoke a sense of 
unfairness, we show how budget information in general and the 
UKÕs annual tax summaries in particular impact support for state 
spending. The stated aim of providing personalised tax receipts to 
income taxpayers is to enhance fiscal transparency, but doing so 
may also damage support for state spending if the information 
provides a sense that existing redistribution is unfair. The article 
contributes to political science debates about public attitudes to tax 
and spending, the character and trade-offs of fiscal transparency, 
and the framing effects of welfare.  
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In November 2014, the UKÕs HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) began posting an 
annual tax summary to every income taxpayer providing them with an itemised 
breakdown and visualisation of how the government has spent their tax over the 
past year. For example, a taxpayer earning £30,000 will be informed that they have 
contributed £1,663 to welfare and £1,280 to health at the top end, and £78 to 
overseas aid and £51 to the EU budget at the bottom end. Costing an estimated 
£5.3m (Sweet 2015), then Chancellor George Osborne justified the scheme as a 
Ôrevolution in transparencyÕ that Ôwill show how hardworking taxpayers have to pay 
for what governments spendÕ (Gov.uk 2014). 
The media coverage that followed the launch highlighted serious concerns 
about how unorthodox and unconventional accounting and categorisation practices 
ensured that ÔwelfareÕ was the largest spending category (BBC 2014; FT.com 
2014). Dame Anne Begg, former Chair of the House of Commons Work and 
Pensions Committee, claimed that the tax summaries were part of an attempt to 
Ômake the phrase welfare almost appear as a dirty wordÕ by giving Ôpeople the 
impression [that] the bulk of welfare goes to working-age unemployed people when 
in reality that is a very small proportionÕ (Guardian 2014). Meanwhile, Frances 
OÕGrady, General Secretary of the Trade Union Congress, went as far to call the 
documents Ôparty political propaganda masquerading as neutral informationÕ (BBC 
2014). The nonpartisan Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) stated that Ôthis is not 
spending that would normally be classed as ÒwelfareÓÕ
 
(Hood and Johnson 2014).  
Underpinning this policy debate is a broader question of relevance to 
political science: What is the effect of providing personally tailored budgetary 
information on public attitudes to tax and spending? In addressing this policy-
relevant and theoretical question, we draw on a novel experiment embedded in a 
national survey based on the UK annual tax summaries. Rather than manipulating 
information regarding expenditure flow Ð for example, by seeing whether 
participants react differently to hypothetical information about either a 40 per cent 
or 20 per cent welfare spend Ð we instead manipulated the way in which real 
spending data is categorised and calculated. To do so, we used alternative annual 
tax summaries created by civil society actors in which welfare was disaggregated 
into smaller categories. By randomly assigning survey participants to receive one of 
these three tax summaries (and a fourth no-information control condition) prior to a 
survey that measures attitudes towards tax, spending, and welfare, we are able to 
test whether the categories used on the HMRC annual tax summaries affect public 
support for current state spending arrangements.  
Our results demonstrate that participants exposed to the HMRC treatment 
are less likely to agree with how tax money is spent and less likely to suggest that 
the current allocation of public funds is a good use of taxpayersÕ money. Despite the 
subtle character of the experimental manipulation, our results therefore demonstrate 
that the way in which budgetary information Ð and, in particular, welfare Ð is 
categorised and presented can influence support for public spending. Ultimately, 
while providing budgetary information in the name of greater transparency may be 
considered part of good governance, budgetary information can be utilised for 
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political ends given that national accounting categories are contestable and indeed 
contested. 
Our findings contribute to three interrelated debates in political science. 
First, by testing theories about state-taxpayer relations, we contribute to a long-
standing literature on taxation and democracy (Levi 1989; Martin et al. 2009; 
Moore 2004; Ross 2004; Steinmo 1993), as well as contemporary political science 
research that draws on methodological innovations and experimental methods in 
studying attitudes toward tax and state spending (Brockmann et al. 2015; Paler 
2013; Zhang et al. 2016). Second, our work contributes to the literature on policy-
relevant discussions about fiscal transparency by highlighting the potential trade-
offs and political dynamics of providing ostensibly objective budgetary information 
(Alt et al. 2014; Alt and Lassen 2006; Benito and Bastida 2009; Heald 2003; Heald 
2012; IMF 2007; OECD 2002). Finally, by placing the welfare-deservingness 
association within an explicit fiscal context, the article contributes to the literature 
on the framing effects of welfare (Petersen et al. 2011; Slothuus 2007; Smith 1987; 
van Oorschot 2006).  
Theory and Context 
Tax as a transaction  
The governmentÕs introduction of annual tax summaries highlights a number of 
problems and puzzles that lie at the heart of modern liberal democracies. Why, for 
instance, do people pay tax? And how does the state ensure that it can legitimately 
extract revenue from its population? This quasi-forceful extraction is required for 
the state to function and therefore lies at the heart of politics as we know it. For 
Joseph Schumpeter, who coined the term tax state, Ôthis is why ÒtaxÓ has so much to 
do with ÒstateÓ that the expression Òtax stateÓ might almost be considered a 
pleonasmÕ (Schumpeter 1954 [1918]). 
There are many tensions within the contemporary tax state. When taxing 
individual citizensÕ income, these tensions can manifest themselves in the character 
of the exchange between taxpayers and the state (Steinmo 1993: 193-5). On the one 
hand, taxpayers get nothing in return for their revenue. Taxation is the obligation to 
contribute money or goods to the state in exchange for Ônothing in particularÕ 
(Martin et al. 2009). To be clear, ÔnothingÕ does not preclude the instances in which 
taxes are sometimes reserved for certain uses, or that the contemporary tax state has 
no obligation to put those resources to public goods and services. Rather, it 
highlights how taxation is an unusual form of economic transaction. Most familiar 
types of transactions Ð ranging from the most formal to the most informal Ð involve 
reciprocal giving and receiving on the basis that a calculable and abstract parity 
between the two actors can be restored. This goes for exchanging cash for 
consumables in a contemporary supermarket as much as it does for when one friend 
claims back a favour two years after the original deed Ð the key difference between 
the two being that in the former there is a legal exchange of property rights. Taxes 
do not work like this. Although there is a legal exchange of property rights, there is 
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no promise of restoring parity between state and taxpayer either formally or 
informally. Although there may be certain expectations, paying taxes comes with no 
explicit guarantees beyond a complex set of social obligations and responsibilities 
that are normally an irredeemable part of the citizenship package. Taxpayers can 
therefore, in some sense, expect nothing in return, even if and when taxation is 
considered integral to oneÕs civic duty.  
On the other hand, in modern democratic societies with elected leaders, the 
contemporary tax state has an obligation to provide something in exchange for tax. 
If taxpayers literally get Ônothing in particularÕ in exchange for tax, then the social 
relations between state and citizen would wane or even break down. Ross (2004) 
captures this dynamic by demonstrating that there is no link between the absolute 
tax burden and fiscal preferences. Rather, fiscal preferences are driven by the tax 
burden relative to the goods and services the government provides. This implies that 
citizens perform a cost-benefit analysis in which the costs of funding the 
government are weighed against the benefits they themselves receive. Ultimately, 
citizens care about the relative price of public goods rather than their absolute cost 
(see also Paler 2013). 
However, taxpayers do not have perfect information about revenue and 
expenditure nor the immediate cognitive capacities to fully conduct the cost-benefit 
analysis required to calculate the relative price they pay for public goods and 
services Ð let alone whether they are getting good value for money (Edlund 1999; 
Larsen 2007: 152-4; Rothstein et al. 2012: 8-10; Svallfors 2013). Instead of a 
quantitatively-generated price based on aggregates of revenue and expenditure 
(which Ross produces), this ÔpriceÕ manifests not numerically but as a sense derived 
through the aggregate of micro-level perceptions and experience of state 
institutions: ÔAre we getting what we deserve?Õ. If there is a widespread sense that 
tax and expenditure is unfair in comparison to public expectation, then revenue 
extraction will be harder to justify. Whereas absolute cost implies that taxpayers 
have only a single preference about taxes, relative price implies that taxpayers have 
a dual and relative preference about both taxes and expenditure as refracted through 
experiences and framings of state institutions. This difference is subtle but 
important. 
This theoretical foundation is consistent with contemporary economics 
literature on tax compliance, evasion, and morale (e.g. Torgler 2007, Kirchler 
2007). Seeking to move beyond the previously foundational assumption that taxes 
are a cost that rational actors wish to minimise, this literature demonstrates how Ôtax 
moraleÕ Ð i.e. an individualÕs intrinsic willingness to pay taxes (Alm and Torgler 
2006) Ð increases when political institutions have higher legitimacy (Torgler and 
Schneider 2007). When there is broader trust in society, then moral appeals to 
fairness may improve tax morale Ð because enforced or coerced compliance can 
corrupt tax morale in an environment of trust (Kirchler et al. 2010). It is also 
consistent with recent political science research into preferences for redistribution. 
For instance, Barnes (2015) finds that the public imagination tends to make a 
distinction between the level of government spending and its structure. She reveals 
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that the most common type of attitude towards tax policy is an ostensibly 
contradictory one, in which a desire for lower tax levels (i.e. decreased 
progressivity) is matched with a desire to see the rich pay more relative to the rest 
(i.e. increased progressivity). Alongside BarnesÕ evidence that respondents were 
able to make a link between levels of spending and levels of taxation (2015: 7-9), 
this suggests that fiscal preferences are driven by relative price rather than absolute 
cost.  
One way to ensure that taxpayers are getting a good price for their public 
goods and services is to increase transparency and provide citizens with information 
about the budget. In recent times, there has been a push towards transparency in 
both fiscal policy and other areas. Scholars and policymakers have argued that 
greater fiscal transparency is a crucial aspect of good governance that allows 
citizens to monitor and assess Ôthe necessary trade-offs between different policy 
options can be assessedÕ (see also Heald 2003; OECD 2002: 9). The UK annual tax 
summaries have been justified by the state as an innovation in fiscal transparency. 
The assumption is that greater information in the form of annual tax summaries will 
provide taxpayers with the knowledge to make an informed decision on whether 
they get a good price for public goods and services in exchange for their tax 
revenue.  
The meaning of welfare 
The way in which HMRC accounted for welfare on the annual tax summaries is 
unorthodox and unconventional inasmuch that it goes against the grain of national 
accounting procedures. As the accompanying official government guidance 
explains, the accounting on the summaries is based on the data published every year 
by the government in the Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis (PESA) (Gov.uk 
2015). PESA is, in turn, structured around the United NationsÕ Classification of the 
Function of Government, which accounts for ten main public expenditure 
categories: general public services; defence; public order and safety; economic 
affairs; environmental protection; housing and community amenities; health; 
recreation, culture and religion; education; social protection (McInnes 2014). For 
the purposes of the tax summary, the PESA category of Ôsocial protectionÕ was split 
up into ÔpensionsÕ and ÔwelfareÕ. While the ÔpensionsÕ category was relatively 
straightforward, the resulting ÔwelfareÕ category included a number of areas Ð such 
as military and nurses pensions, or long term social care Ð that are not typically 
considered as welfare. As we discuss in the next section, this categorisation of 
welfare is the crux of our experimental design.   
It should be noted here that there is nothing a priori controversial about 
welfare, to the extent that we would expect different categorisations of welfare to 
significantly affect whether taxpayers agree with how the government spent their 
money and whether that spending is a good use of taxpayer money. After all, the 
National Health Service is one of the most popular public institutions in the UK, 
and many British citizens would likely support programmes that aimed to improve 
the welfare of the country as a whole.  Rather, the term ÔwelfareÕ has come to 
 6 
possess negative connotations, with associations in particular with means-tested 
cash transfers to the poor rather than with social protection per se. The comparative 
welfare states literature suggests the most convincing explanation for this shift in 
the meaning of the term. 
This scholarship has long argued that a feedback loop explains low levels of 
support for redistribution in liberal welfare regimes such as the UK (Larsen 2007). 
Those regimes tend to favour means-tested or selective social protection in a way 
that implies a judgement that some recipients are worthier than others (Rothstein 
1998). Those who receive means-tested benefits are typically stigmatised as 
undeserving of help (Soroka et al. 2013). There is a consistent pattern regarding the 
deservingness of different social groups: the elderly are seen as the most deserving, 
and the unemployed and immigrants are seen as the least deserving, with other 
social groups somewhere between (van Oorschot 2006). In liberal welfare states 
(such as the UK) in which hard work and self-reliance are considered important to 
maximising life chances, it is unsurprising that welfare recipients are often 
considered undeserving.  
The British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey provides an authoritative 
overview of trends in British public opinion and helps identify prevailing 
stereotypes about welfare. As the political science literature suggests, the disabled 
and children are consistently high priorities, while the unemployed are considered 
the least important (Park et al. 2013; Taylor-Gooby 2013: 53). Moreover, public 
attitudes towards unemployment benefit have significantly hardened in recent times. 
On this topic, the survey asks participants whether they believe that unemployment 
benefit is either too low and causes hardship or too high and discourages work (Park 
et al. 2014; Taylor-Gooby 2013: 35). Throughout the 1980s and up until the middle 
of the 1990s, nearly half of those surveyed said that unemployment benefit was Ôtoo 
lowÕ and Ôcause[s] hardshipÕ in comparison to around 30 per cent who answered 
Ôtoo high, discourage workÕ. Between 1997 and 2003 this trend reversed, with 
upward of 60 per cent now answering Ôtoo high, discourage workÕ compared to 20 
per cent who answer Ôtoo low, cause hardshipÕ.  
This simultaneous shift in British attitudes towards social protection and in 
the meaning of the word welfare mirrors earlier trends in the US. The term has 
become synonymous with dependency and labour market activation rather than its 
historical roots in promoting equality and social justice (Lister 1998). Political 
scientists have held a long-term interest in the framing effects of welfare (e.g. 
Jacoby 2000). US research has especially focused on the racially coded character of 
welfare (Gilens 1999), which is less, but not uncompletely, relevant to the UK (Ford 
2015). Beyond race, Smith (1987) demonstrated how US survey participants 
provided systematically different answers when asked a variety of questions about 
whether spending should be increased on ÔwelfareÕ compared to Ôassistance for the 
poorÕ and Ôcaring for the poorÕ. Smith found that asking about ÔwelfareÕ produced 
consistently more negative evaluations than Ôthe poorÕ (Feldman and Steenbergen 
2001: 668-9; Smith 1987: 76), and he essentially explains this result with reference 
to deservingness (Smith 1987: 79). Beyond welfare, other research has shown how 
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tax preferences can be explained by framing effects (McCaffrey and Baron 2004; 
Lfgren and Nordblom 2009). Overall, this suggests that welfare can have framing 
effects through triggering concerns about the ÔpriceÕ of public services and 
individualsÕ relative tax burden.  
In sum, we expect that annual tax summaries will affect support for current 
state spending arrangements. By providing itemised and individually-tailored 
information about how the state spends an individualÕs revenue, the annual tax 
summaries should alter the price that taxpayers think they get in exchange for their 
tax: this information should provide a sense of getting a better or worse price than 
expected, which should ultimately affect whether current state spending 
arrangements are justifiable. We therefore expect that manipulating the welfare 
category on the annual tax summaries presented to participants will make a 
difference: in contrast to those that receive the HMRC statement that shows welfare 
as the largest category, those that receive a summary in which welfare is 
disaggregated in line with conventional accounting procedures will be more 
supportive of government spending, more supportive of welfare spending, and think 
that there are less people on welfare.  
Research Design 
Survey-Embedded Experiment 
We designed our stimulus materials based upon the official HMRC tax summary, as 
well as alternatives provided by two civil society actors that have been active in the 
resulting public debate. The first alternative summary was compiled by the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies (IFS), which argues that Ôthere might be a caseÕ for providing a 
more detailed breakdown of welfare spending (Hood and Johnson 2014). The IFS 
tax summary is exactly the same as the official HMRC version, except that it draws 
on formal government accounting frameworks to disaggregate the welfare category 
into four parts: personal social services, public service pensions, other benefit 
spending on pensioners, and other benefit spending on those of working age. 
Crucially, this ensures that ÔhealthÕ is now the largest category on the annual tax 
summary.  
The second alternative summary was presented on the Tax Research UK 
(TRUK) blog (Murphy 2014). Rather than simply disaggregating welfare, the 
TRUK summary uses alternative accounting figures that results in twenty-five 
distinct categories. We opted to include the TRUK summary because it provides 
two interesting contrasts to both the HMRC and IFS equivalents. First, like the IFS 
summary, the TRUK version disaggregates welfare, but, unlike the IFS summary, 
the TRUK version has Ôspecific non-employment benefitsÕ as the largest category. 
Second, the TRUK includes ÔspendsÕ such as tax reliefs that are not typically 
considered expenditure. In combination with the larger quantity of categories, this 
means that the TRUK summary is more complex and thus harder to digest than the 
other two. It is important to note that each of the annual tax summaries are based on 
justifiable, albeit contestable, accounting procedures. They provide the basis of our 
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experimental conditions and provide greater external validity because they are 
legitimate alternatives to the information that taxpayers would receive. 
Participants were assigned to one of four treatment conditions, which 
corresponded to the three different tax summaries (HMRC, IFS, TRUK) and a true 
control condition without any tax information (see Appendix for examples of the 
materials used in each condition). Great care was taken to ensure that the tax 
summaries mimicked the original document that was mailed to UK households, and 
that the different versions were as comparable as possible across treatment 
conditions. To add to the authenticity of the experiment, we ensured subjects 
received tax information relevant to their self-reported income bands (we created 
tax summaries for annual income that was estimated at £20,000, £40,000, or 
£60,000).
1
 In total, our experiment had 9 potential versions of the tax summary 
documents resulting from a 3 (organisation: HMRC, IFS, TRUK) x 3 (income: 
£20k, £40k, £60k) between-subjects design, plus a true control condition
2
. 
 Following exposure to the tax summary document (or no information in the 
control condition), participants answered three blocks of questions focussing on: (1) 
the value and benefit of the tax summary documents, (2) government spending, 
budget priorities, tax, and welfare, and (3) the category of welfare. For the first set 
of questions, we included several items to assess participantsÕ attitudes toward the 
tax summaries along three qualitatively different dimensions. This entails evaluating 
the extent to which the tax summaries (i) provide information about government 
spending, (ii) create accountability for spending priorities, and (iii) offer value to the 
public. Two items tapped each of these three dimensions (on 5-point scales from 
ÔStrongly DisagreeÕ to ÔStrongly AgreeÕ): information was measured by questions 
about the degree to which participantsÕ agreed that tax summaries would Ômake tax 
clearerÕ and Ôinform citizens about governmentÕ; accountability was assessed by 
Ôincrease the transparency of governmentÕ and Ômake government more honestÕ; and 
value was captured with Ôprovide good value for moneyÕ and Ôbe useful to me 
personallyÕ. 
 For the second set of questions, our regression models focus on four 
outcomes of interest that capture a range of potential effects from our survey-
embedded experiment. First and foremost, we asked participants whether they 
agreed with how the government apportioned their individual tax: ÔThinking about 
your Annual Tax Summary, do you agree or disagree with how the government 
spent your tax money last year?Õ. Responses ranged from ÔStrongly DisagreeÕ to 
ÔStrongly AgreeÕ on a 5-point scale (M = 2.96, SD = 0.94).  Second, we asked 
participants: ÔOverall, would you say that the government's current allocation of 
                                                   
1
 Participants who said that they earned less than £10,000 or refused to provide income information 
were assigned to a condition that assumed their taxable income was £20,000; however, our results 
remain unchanged when these individuals are excluded from the analyses. 
2
 One in four participants indicated that they had already received an official annual tax summary 
from the UK government; however, the proportion of these individuals does not significantly differ 
by experimental condition. In addition, the results from our analyses are not substantively different 
when excluding these participants. The mean time spent reviewing the tax documents was 53.3 
seconds (median = 35 seconds). 
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public funds is a good use of taxpayer money?Õ. Responses to this item ranged from 
ÔNot At All Good UseÕ to ÔVery Good UseÕ on a 4-point scale (M = 2.47, SD = 
0.72).  Third, we gauged participantsÕ perceptions toward welfare by asking: ÔIf you 
had to guess, what percentage of an average taxpayer's contribution do you think 
goes towards welfare?Õ. Responses could range from 0 to 100 per cent (M = 22.78, 
SD = 16.89)
3
. Finally, we asked participants about their preference toward welfare 
spending on a 5-point scale: ÔDo you think the government should spend more, less, 
or about the same for welfare?Õ. High values indicate support for greater spending 
on welfare (M = 2.83, SD = 1.13). These four dependent variables allow us to 
specifically test the effect of exposure to variations of the tax summaries on public 
attitudes toward tax and welfare. 
 For the final set of questions about the category of welfare, we devised two 
ways of uncovering how the public define the term. First, we provided participants 
with a number of different scenarios that detailed situations in which people 
received benefits from the state, and then asked whether these people should be 
considered welfare recipients. One example scenario reads: ÔImagine an out-of-
work single mother who currently receives £423 per week in various benefits to 
help support her three children. Should this person be considered a welfare 
recipient?Õ. Scenarios that corresponded to the HMRC definition of ÔwelfareÕ were 
included (i.e., nurses employment pension, family tax credit).
4
  Second, we then 
provided participants with a list of different types of state-provided social protection 
and asked participants to judge whether each type should be considered welfare. 
The types tested were: workplace pensions for nurses, visiting a GP surgery (i.e., an 
appointment with a doctor), state pension, winter fuel allowance (i.e., a tax-free 
payment of between £100 and £300 to help the elderly pay heating bills), long-term 
care for the elderly, child tax credit, child benefit, jobseekers allowance, income 
support, and housing benefit. These were selected on the basis that they correspond 
to well-noted differences in perceived deservingness and to again test public 
definitions of welfare against the HMRC definition used in the tax summaries.  
Data 
A total of 2,722 participants completed our online survey from July 8
th
 to 14
th
, 2015, 
roughly two months after the 2015 UK General Election.
5
 After filtering the data for 
quality control, we ended up with a sample of 1,932.
6
 Demographically, our sample 
                                                   
3
 One thing that is striking is the relative accuracy of citizens to identify the portion of the budget 
that is allocated to welfare (even in conditions which provided no tax information or did not mention 
welfare by name in the tax summary). 
4
 The full scenarios can be viewed, along with the results, in Figure 6. 
5
 Our survey-embedded experiment was facilitated by Toluna, an affiliate of Harris Interactive, 
which has survey panels in 46 countries (and partners in 90 countries). In the UK, Toluna has an 
active panel of more than 400,000 online participants from which to draw a sample. 
6
 To ensure the quality of our data, we embedded two attention checks deeply within the survey: 552 
participants (20.2% of the total) were dropped for failing to correctly answer quality check 1; another 
202 participants (9.3% of the remaining total) were dropped for missing quality check 2. In addition, 
we examined average survey completion times to ensure that the remaining participants finished the 
survey within a reasonable amount of time. To this end, we removed an additional 36 participants 
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compares quite favourably to other high quality Internet panels within the UK. In 
Table 1 we provide key demographics from our survey in comparison to a 
November 2014 YouGov survey on government spending (which we will discuss 
later as a robustness check), and Wave 6 of the 2014-2017 British Election Study 
Internet Panel, which was conducted in May 2015. The median age of participants 
is 50 years old, and participants resided in 77 different counties. The sample also 
contained a good mix of supporters of the various UK political parties: Conservative 
Party (29%), Labour Party (24%), UK Independence Party (10%), Liberal 
Democrats (7%), Green Party (5%), and the Scottish National Party (3.2%), as well 
as those affiliated with other parties or unaffiliated (22%). Roughly even numbers 
of men and women completed the survey (54% of the sample is female), and the 
modal income category was £10,000 to £29,999 (47%). One-third of survey 
participants reported that they held a university degree or higher, and nearly 
everyone (96%) indicated that they were British citizens. In short, our survey data 
reflects a good mix of individuals in the UK. 
Results 
Attitudes towards budgetary information  
We begin by exploring public perceptions of the UK governmentÕs tax transparency 
programme by comparing those who received tax summaries with those who in the 
control condition (n = 584).
7
 For the control group, there appears to be mixed 
support for the tax summaries across the three dimensions of information, 
accountability, and value (see Figure 1). First, we find that a majority of these 
participants agree that the tax summaries should increase information: 58 per cent 
agreed that the documents would make tax clearer, and the same proportion of 
participants felt the documents would provide citizens with information. Half of the 
sample (53 per cent) agreed that the tax summaries would increase government 
transparency, yet only 38 per cent felt that the tax summaries would make 
government more honest. Interestingly, citizens seemed to think that the tax 
summaries would not be particularly useful, with only 40 per cent agreeing with this 
statement, while only 1 in 4 participants thought they would provide good value for 
money. In short, citizens acknowledged that the tax summaries would provide 
information, are mixed about whether they would lead to greater accountability, and 
do not seem to think they provide good value for money. 
One added benefit from our survey-embedded experiment is that we can test 
whether actually receiving a tax summary document affects public perceptions 
toward the governmentÕs transparency programme (see Figure 1). Compared to 
                                                                                                                                              
who fell 3 standard deviations away from the mean time of 16.8 minutes (median = 9.4 minutes). 
Thus, the total number of participants for these analyses is 1,932, and the new mean survey 
completion time was 11.7 minutes. Given that the subject matter for this experiment concerned the 
rather narrow topic of tax policy, it is perhaps unsurprising that this proportion of participants was 
dropped from further consideration. 
7
 For a subsample of approximately 584 participants, the margin of sampling error is plus or minus 4 
per cent. 
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those in the control condition, participants in the treatment conditions Ð regardless 
of tax summary version Ð were significantly more likely to agree that the tax 
summaries increased information, accountability, and value. On average, 
respondents showed a 10 percentage point increase in the three aforementioned 
areas. Thus, citizens responded favourably to the actual HMRC tax summary (and 
IFS and TRUK alternatives) once they were given an opportunity to peruse them. 
Attitudes towards tax, spending, and welfare 
Now we move on to test whether providing individuals with detailed information 
about how their tax contributions were allocated would affect their attitudes toward 
government spending, particularly with respect to welfare. To this end, we regressed 
agreement with how their tax money was spent on our treatment dummy variables 
(the HMRC version served as the excluded category because this question was only 
asked of those who viewed their tax summary). Looking at the results presented in 
Table 2 and the leftmost portion of Figure 2, we find a statistically significant 
increase in support for tax spending for the IFS condition (b = 0.29, se = 0.12, 
p<.05, n = 1,340), such that exposure to the IFS tax document increases the 
probability of support for how the UK government spent their tax money. The 
coefficient for those in the TRUK condition was in the correct direction, but did not 
reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Although no treatment group 
showed great support for how tax was spent, the predicted probability of support for 
tax spending was highest in the IFS version (0.35) and lowest in the HMRC version 
(0.29) with TRUK in the middle (0.33). In short, there was a modest decrease in 
support for current spending of tax money when presented with the HMRC version 
of the tax summary relative to the IFS version. Given that this manipulation was the 
only difference between the two documents, the subtle change in the presentation of 
spending information is the mechanism at play.  
Next, we regressed whether citizens felt the current budget allocation was a 
good use of taxpayer money on our treatment dummies (this time using the no tax 
summary control condition as the excluded category). Once again, we find a 
statistically significant increase in evaluations for participants in the IFS condition 
(b = 0.26, se = 0.12, p<.05, n = 1,915), but no comparable increase for those in the 
HMRC condition (b = 0.05, se = 0.12, p=.65) or TRUK conditions (b = 0.04, se = 
0.12, p=.72). The results are provided in column 2 of Table 2, and the predicted 
probabilities of agreement are presented in Figure 2. The results show that 
participants in the IFS version had a different attitude toward government spending 
than their peers. 
 Given the associations between welfare and deservingness within the wider 
public debate, it is also important to test whether the HMRC tax summary causes 
individuals to provide significantly higher estimates of the proportions of the budget 
going to welfare. To test this possibility, we regressed estimates of the portion of tax 
that goes toward welfare on the treatment conditions (the control condition serves as 
the excluded category). In line with our expectations, we find a statistically 
significant effect for participants in the HMRC condition (b = 2.57, se = 1.05, 
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p<.05, n = 1,907). There are no other statistically significant differences across 
treatment conditions: IFS (b = 1.03, se = 1.08, p = .34), TRUK (b = -1.16, se = 1.07, 
p = .28). The estimates from this regression are provided in column 3 of Table 2, 
and the predicted values are presented in Figure 2. These results demonstrate that 
while the effect size is modest, citizens who receive the HMRC version of the tax 
summary are more likely than those in the control condition to say that a larger 
portion of their tax money is spent on welfare. Although not necessarily surprising, 
this finding is nonetheless important because it demonstrates that exposure to the 
tax summaries shapes knowledge about state spending Ð and, in turn, that the 
categorisation of the spending information matters.  
Finally, we regressed support for welfare spending on our experimental 
treatments (the control condition served as the excluded category). Here, we do not 
find a statistically significant increase in support among any of the treatment 
conditions (though there is directional evidence of a decrease in support for welfare 
spending only among those in the HMRC condition; b = -0.19, se = 0.11, p<.10, n = 
1,893) relative to those in the control. The results are presented in column 4 of 
Table 2 and plotted in the rightmost portion of Figure 2.  
Robustness check  
One way to ensure the robustness of our results is to test the effect of the different 
tax summaries in another dataset. A November 2014 YouGov survey experiment (n 
= 2,047) into the impact of the annual tax summaries on public attitudes about tax 
and government spending is of particular use (see Table 1 for the demographic 
profile of the sample). Rather than building their experimental manipulation on 
alternative tax summary documents, the YouGov experiment instead presented two 
randomly assigned groups with different tax summary prompts (also based on the 
HMRC and IFS conditions as in our experiment) prior to a series of survey 
questions on government spending and welfare. These prompts are follows: 
 
Version 1: ÔAccording to the government figures, a total of 37% of 
government spending goes on welfare and state pensions. This is broken down 
by the government as 25% on welfare and 12% on state pensionsÕ (n = 1,011). 
 
Version 2: ÔAccording to the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), a total of 30% 
of government spending goes on welfare and state pensions. This is broken 
down as follows: 14% on benefits aimed at older people (including the state 
pension), 6% on benefits for the unemployed and those on low incomes, 5% on 
benefits for the sick and disabled, 5% on benefits aimed at families with 
childrenÕ (n = 1.036). 
 
Following each prompt, participants were asked to answer the following question on 
a 5-point scale (high values indicate that the government spends Ôtoo littleÕ): ÔDo 
you think the government spends too much, too little or about the right amount on 
welfare?Õ. Although this question differs from ours, it nevertheless tests the same 
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theoretical claims regarding fiscal preferences, budgetary information, and the 
framing effects of welfare.  
 We regressed opinion toward welfare spending on the treatment dummy 
variable (Version 1 served as the excluded category). In line with our results, we 
find a statistically significant treatment effect: those participants who received 
Version 2 (the IFS prompt) were significantly more likely to say that the 
government spends much too little on welfare relative to those who were exposed to 
Version 1 (the HMRC prompt); b = 0.34, se = 0.08, p<.001, n = 1,815. In other 
words, citizens who were exposed to HMRC budgeting information (Version 1) 
were more likely to think the government is already spending too much on welfare. 
The predicted probability of reporting that the government spends too much on 
welfare is .44 in the Version 1 condition, while only .36 in the Version 2 condition. 
Although the effects of the experimental conditions are modest Ð a 23% increase in 
the predicted probability Ð we would nevertheless stress that they result from what 
appears to be a brief exposure to information about tax.  
Categorising welfare 
Finally, participants were asked whether a number of different personal scenarios 
and types of social protection should be categorised as welfare or not. The results 
are presented in Figures 3 and 4. The results demonstrate the uneven way in which 
people who receive benefits or protection from the state are categorised as Ôwelfare 
recipientsÕ (or not). Figure 3 highlights how the vast majority think that the single 
mother and the recently unemployed person are welfare recipients. The family 
receiving tax credits are somewhere in the middle. The retired nurse and the Eastern 
European visiting the doctor are generally not considered welfare recipients. Figure 
4 clearly demonstrates this pattern. As expected, these results highlight a link 
between the perceived deservingness of a group and the extent to which they are 
considered a welfare recipient. The results also highlight how certain areas of social 
protection, such as unemployment benefits, are more likely to be considered as 
welfare than others, such as tax credits, and especially pensions. 
Thus, the label of a welfare recipient is not applied based upon the quantity 
of state support received; rather, some sort of value judgement is a more important 
determinant. This is especially clear when it comes to pensioners. The state spends 
around 20 times more on state pensions than it does on unemployment benefits. 
However, since pensioners are typically deemed the most deserving recipients of 
state help, unemployment benefit recipients receive much more public vitriol. This 
is reflected in our results, in which pensioners are not typically considered as 
welfare recipients. All in all, these results suggest that the category of ÔwelfareÔ 
used by HMRC in the annual tax summaries does not reflect the meaning of the 
term in the popular imagination.  
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Discussion and conclusion 
Beyond the immediate and self-evident implications for the annual tax summary 
policy in the UK, these results have implications for three debates in political 
science: (1) the interaction between state-taxpayer relations and state legitimacy; (2) 
framing effects on tax preferences; and (3) the trade-offs of providing ostensibly 
objective budgetary information in the name of transparency. The discussion about 
fiscal state legitimacy started from the observation that the relationship between the 
state and income taxpayers is unusual. On the one hand, taxpayers ought to expect 
nothing in return for their quasi-voluntary tax compliance, as parity cannot be 
restored between the two parties because of the character of public goods and 
services. On the other hand, taxpayers certainly do expect at least something in 
return for their tax money; otherwise, the social relations and sense of civic duty 
that underpin ostensibly coercive income tax collection would be unjust, and 
therefore the legitimacy of the state could wane. On the basis of these dynamics, 
fiscal preferences are theorised as emerging from the relative price paid for public 
goods and services Ð but because of imperfect information and other factors, this 
price manifests itself as a sense of fairness and is refracted through institutional 
settings and framing effects.  
We have placed fiscal transparency, budget information, and the annual tax 
summaries within this context. We discovered differences between those who 
received the HMRC summaries and, in particular, those who received the IFS 
summaries. Generally, and in comparison to those who received the IFS summaries, 
those who received the HMRC are (1) less likely to agree with how the government 
spent their money, (2) less likely to indicate that current government spending is a 
good use of taxpayer money, and (3) more likely to guess that the government 
spends more on welfare. Crucially, the only difference between the HMRC and IFS 
summaries was the way in which social protection was represented. 
We explain this finding through the framing effects of welfare: the British 
public typically make a link between that term and undeserving benefit recipients. 
The results from the final part of the survey on categorising welfare demonstrates 
that although many different groups of people receive state-funded help, members 
of the public instead focus on certain groups in society: the less stereotypically 
ÔdeservingÕ a group is considered, the more likely they are to be deemed to be 
welfare recipients. The annual tax summaries effectively signal to taxpayers that 
other types of people are the beneficiaries of their money Ð and that, by extension, 
current spending arrangements are a poor use of taxpayersÕ money.  In other words, 
the tax summaries affect taxpayersÕ sense of what price they are paying for their 
public goods and services. The findings therefore support and extend existing 
research on the framing effects of tax on redistributive preferences.  
It is important to emphasise the effect sizes we observed are modest. This is 
indeed what we would expect given the character of the experimental study. After 
all, this experiment systematically tested whether support for state spending is 
affected by manipulating just the categories of state spending, as opposed to state 
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spending per se. Furthermore, the effects we found occur after a brief exposure to 
the tax summary information (i.e., less than 1 minute mean perusal time). We might 
expect larger effects if taxpayers were to attend to the information more carefully, 
or if they discussed it with family, friends, and others within their social networks.  
The results also have implications for how we understand fiscal 
transparency. Up to this point, we have purposely avoided the question of whether 
the HMRC or IFS summary is more accurate or transparent than the other. In 
response, we would suggest that this is the wrong question to be asking. The 
existing literature on fiscal transparency sometimes uses the analogy of a trade-off 
between the Ôvalue of sunlightÕ and Ôthe danger of over-exposureÕ when states 
strengthen their fiscal transparency (Heald 2003: 723-9). On the basis of our 
argument, we would like to push this logic even further. 
Rather than conceptualising fiscal transparency through an optical analogy 
in which light is allowed to pass through budgeting so that objects behind can be 
distinctly seen, fiscal transparency can also be conceptualised as a type of tool that 
allows information to be built and disseminated in a particular way. In this 
alternative tool-based analogy, national accounting, like all forms of economic 
calculation and accounting, is not simply a neutral representation of an underlying 
reality (Miller and Rose 1990: 11-14). Instead, those categories and calculations are 
the result of political forces in which a choice of one method is selected over an 
alternative (Mgge 2016). Providing budget information in the name of fiscal 
transparency can never be truly objective inasmuch as there is no object to represent 
(MacKenzie et al. 2007; Larsen 2017); there are only certain tools that, in a sense, 
make and re-make knowledge of state spending in particular (political) ways. That 
is not to say that some representations may simply be misleading or erroneous, but 
that once past that point there is still plenty of room to move within the boundaries 
of legitimate accounting. The inherently political character of national accounting 
decisions may occasionally shine through the otherwise misty grey world of day-to-
day fiscal affairs Ð as it did with HMRCÕs annual tax summaries. Most of the time, 
however, it does not. Deliberation and public debate to ensure that accounting 
categories are justifiable and in line with the values and conventions of society 
might, therefore, help ensure that budget information is impartial.  
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Figure 1. Public opinion toward the tax summary documents 
 
 
Notes: Black bars indicate support for each statement among those who received a tax 
summary; grey bars are for those in the no tax summary control condition. 
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Figure 2. Effects of exposure to different versions of tax summary information on attitudes toward tax and welfare spending.  
 
Notes: Predicted probabilities (or values) from simple regression models in which the experimental treatment conditions serve as predictors and 
the no tax summary control condition is the reference category (the HMRC tax summary serves as the reference category for the ÔAgree with tax 
allocationÕ model); error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 3.  Public attitudes of what constitutes welfare by hypothetical scenarios   
 
 
Notes: Bars indicate the percentage of respondents who agreed that the named benefit should 
be categorised as welfare. 
  
EU citizen from Eastern Europe, who has recently 
migrated to the UK for work, visits the GP for a 
routine check up 
Retired senior nurse, who currently receives £60 
per week through state pension and £192 through 
employment pension 
Family with 3 children (household income of 
£30,000 and both parents work to support them) 
receives £50 per week through the family tax 
credit 
Out-of-work single mother who currently receives 
£423 per week in various benefits to help support 
her 3 children 
Someone receiving around £120 per week in 
unemployment benefit after being made redundant 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
 19 
Figure 4. Public attitudes of what constitutes welfare by named benefit 
  
 
Notes: Bars indicate the percentage of respondents who agreed that the named benefit should 
be categorised as welfare.  
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Table 1. Sample comparisons by key demographics 
 
Tax and Welfare Survey 
(July 2015) 
YouGov Survey 
(November 2014) 
2014-17 British Election Study 
Internet Panel 
(Wave 6, May 2015) 
Female 54.6% 51.8% 50.3% 
Age (median yrs.) 50 49 53 
Income (mode) £10,000 to £29,999 -- £10,000 to £29,999 
University Degree (or higher)  33.7% 34.7% 29.6% 
Party Affiliation    
Conservative 28.7% 23.4% 27.1% 
Labour 24.1% 28.1% 28.7% 
Liberal Democrat 7.0% 5.0% 7.0% 
SNP 3.2% 4.3% 6.1% 
UKIP 9.9% 13.1% 6.1% 
Green Party 5.1% 6.4% 3.6% 
Other / No Party 22.0% 19.6% 21.5% 
N 1,932 2,047 30,027 
Notes: Tax and Welfare Survey: Data were collected by Toluna, an affiliate of Harris Interactive, from 8-14 July 2015. YouGov Survey: Data 
were collected from 4-5 November 2014; income was not asked; vote intention for the 2015 UK General Election was used as a proxy for party 
affiliation. 2014-17 British Election Study Internet Panel: Data were collected from 8-26 May 2015. All estimates are from the unweighted data. 
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Table 2. Regression Results of Preferences toward Government Spending by Tax Summary Treatment Condition 
 
Attitudes toward Tax Attitudes toward Welfare 
 Model 1: 
Agree with Allocation 
Model 2: 
Good Use of Funds 
Model 3: 
Per cent on Welfare 
Model 4: 
Spend on Welfare 
Experimental Condition     
HMRC -- 
0.05 
(0.12) 
2.57* 
(1.05) 
-0.19  
(0.11) 
IFS 
0.29* 
(0.12) 
0.26* 
(0.12) 
1.03 
(1.08) 
-0.04 
(0.12) 
TRUK 
0.18 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
-1.16 
(1.06) 
0.13 
(0.11) 
No Tax Summary 
(Control Condition) 
-- -- -- -- 
Intercept -- -- 
22.19 
(0.70) 
-- 
     
Model Ordered Logit Ordered Logit OLS Ordered Logit 
N 1,340 1,915 1,907 1,893 
     
Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. In Model 1, the tax summary provided by the 
UK government serves as the excluded category; in Models 2-4, the control condition (i.e., no tax summary) serves as the excluded category. * 
indicates a statistical significance, p<.05.
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Appendix 
Example of official HM Revenue and Customs' (HMRC) annual tax summary  
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Example of Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) annual tax summary 
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Example of Tax Research UK (TRUK) annual tax summary 
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